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Abstract 
 
This paper explores the conditions that influenced the relationship between the EU and NGOs and 
their mutual success in a case of human security negotiations: the 2006 UN Small Arms Review 
Conference (RevCon).  The uncontrolled spread of small arms and light  weapons (SALW) is 
considered a direct threat to human security. The EU has presented itself as a leader in the fight 
against the proliferation of SALW and has emphasized the need to work in partnership with civil 
society to address this issue. This paper suggests that the EU and  NGOs under the umbrella 
organization IANSA (International Action Network on Small Arms) appeared to present a united 
front and to form a coalition at the Review Conference. However, the partnership between the EU 
and NGOs was unsuccessful: the RevCon was not able to adopt a final document. This paper uses 
a multi-level game approach and the literature on coalitions in multilateral negotiations to analyze 
EU-NGO  interactions  during  negotiations  at  the  RevCon.  The  paper  argues  that  the  EU’s 
willingness to listen to NGOs did not transform itself into formal cooperation: no plan of action 
was agreed between these two actors. It also suggests that while NGOs intensely lobbied several 
key EU member states, the NGOs’ approach towards the EU as a collective actor was much 
weaker. Ultimately, the coalition formed by the EU and NGOs also failed to acquire the support 
of key players, particularly the United States. Finally, this paper highlights that the negotiations 
process can have a direct influence on the EU’s relationship with NGOs: the consensus rule of the 
Review Conference directly affected their mutual success.   3   
 
Introduction 
  
In recent years, the European Union has reiterated its commitment to the United Nations and 
pledged to work toward strengthening this organization. Since the early 1990s, the UN has been 
increasingly  active  in  the  policy  area  of  international  human  security.
1  The  EU,  which  is 
considered by some as a driving force in the UN policy process 
2, has presented itself as an 
important actor in the promotion of concrete actions on several human security issues.
3 The EU 
has also emphasized the need to work in partnership with civil society to address these issues. 
This paper explores the conditions that might have influenced the relationship between the EU 
and NGOs and their mutual success in a case of human security negotiations at the UN: the 2006 
Small Arms Review Conference (RevCon). The paper suggests that although the EU and NGOs 
under the umbrella organization IANSA (International Action Network on Small Arms) appeared 
to present a united front and to form a coalition at the RevCon, the partnership between the EU 
and NGOs was unsuccessful: the Review Conference was not able to adopt a final document. 
 
This  paper  begins  by  examining  why  the  European  Union  has  become  an  active  actor  in 
international negotiations on the issue of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and how the EU 
strengthen  its  relationship  with  NGOs  to  deal  with  this  issue.  The  paper  then  proposes  an 
analytical framework that combines a multilevel game approach with concepts from the literature 
on coalitions in multilateral negotiations to analyze the interactions between the EU and NGOs at 
the  Review  Conference.  The  paper  argues  that  the  analysis  of  the  EU-NGOs  relationship  in 
SALW negotiations at the UN requires the understanding of the ways in which a complex web of 
actors and institutions interact at three different levels: UN, EU and domestic. In addition, recent 
literature  on  international  relations  has  shown  that  the  cooperative  efforts  of  NGOs, 
Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) and middle powers can create alternative and effective 
solutions to enduring international security problems. 
  
                                                 
1 The concept of human security was put forward to describe new security concerns and to emphasize the 
shift from a state concerned security to a people-centered approach to security. See S. Lodgaard, Human 
Security;  Concept  and  Operationalization,  Geneva:  Expert  Seminar  on  Human  Rights  and  Peace, 
December  2000.  For  a  critical  view,  see  R.  Paris  “Human  Security:  Paradigm  Shift  or  Hot  Air?”, 
International Security, Vol. 26, No. 2. (Autumn, 2001), pp. 87-102. 
2 See K.V. Laatikainen, “Assessing the EU as an Actor at the UN: Authority, Cohesion, Recognition and 
Autonomy”, CFSP Forum, vol.2,no.1, 2004, p.4-5. 
3 See “Human Security and Aid effectiveness: the EU’s Challenges”, speech by European Commissioner 
Ferrero-Waldner, Overseas Development Institute, London, 26 October 2006.   4   
Using  this  analytical  framework  and  various  qualitative  methods  such  as  expert  interviews, 
documentary analysis and participant observation, this paper examines the interactions between 
the EU and NGOs (under the umbrella organization IANSA) at the Review Conference in order 
to identify significant factors which might have affected their mutual success. 
 
1. The European Union and the Challenge of Small Arms and Light Weapons 
 
Small arms and light weapons constitute the types of armament that are most frequently used in 
conflicts. Responsible for the majority of armed conflict deaths, they are used in more than 40% 
of homicides in the world. In 2006, the estimated number of SALW in existence is around 640 
millions.
4  The  proliferation  of  SALW  attracted  the  attention  of  the  international  community 
following the sudden increase of the global arms trade after the end of the Cold War.
5  Small 
arms and light weapons were massively used in the internal conflicts in the 1990s in Rwanda, 
Somalia and in the Balkans. NGOs and international organizations were also confronted daily 
with the effects of the use of SALW.
6 Following the signature of the Ottawa Convention in 1997, 
a treaty banning the use of anti-personnel landmines, numerous states, international organizations 
and NGOs called attention to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons as the next human 
security issue which needed to be addressed. However, in contrast to the landmines case, the idea 
of the adopting of a comprehensive ban of SALW was never considered. Indeed, small arms are 
being used by armed forces and police forces around the world and legally owned by civilians in 
many states. A much broader approach would thus be needed to effectively deal with the small 
arms issue. 
 
In the late 1990s, the EU became one of the most vocal actors to support UN actions taken to 
stem the proliferation of this type of weapon. This can be explained by a number of factors. First, 
several  EU  Member  States  were  important  exporters  of  small  arms.
7  These  starts  began  to 
recognize that an increasing portion of their small arms production was being “recycled” and 
illegally  sold  on  the  global  arms  market.  In  addition,  systematic  studies  showed  that  large 
                                                 
4 See Small Arm Survey, Small Arms Survey 2006 – Unfinished Business, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006. 
5 J. Spear “Arms and Arms Control” in B. White, R. Little and M. Smith (eds.), Issues in World Politics, 3
rd 
ed., Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, pp.105-106. 
6  See  L.  Lumpe  (ed),  Small  Arms  Control:  Old  Weapons,  New  Issues,  UNIDIR-Ashgate  Publishing 
Limited, May 1999,  p.XVI 
7 In 1995 the EU accounted for 33% of the total arms export. See P. Eavis and W. Benson, “The European 
Union  and  the  Light  Weapons  Trade”  in  J.  Boutwell  and  M.T.  Klare  (eds.)  Light  Weapons  and  Civil 
Conflict, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999, p.89.   5   
quantities  of  arms  were  smuggled  through  the  EU  and  brokered  by  EU  companies  and 
individuals.
8 Second, EU activities in the areas of development assistance, humanitarian aid and 
conflict prevention were being directly affected by the proliferation of small arms. 
 
The production and export of small arms remaining within the competence of EU Member States, 
EU actions on small arms would have to be agreed within the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) framework.
9  The first real step to address the small arms issue in the EU was 
taken in 1997 when the EU Council of Ministers adopted a political declaration, the Programme 
for  Preventing  and  Combating  Illicit  Trafficking  in  Conventional  Arm.
10  This  Programme 
provided a framework for addressing the small arms issues and reiterated the EU support for UN 
initiatives tackling the illicit arms trade. A few months later, during its EU Presidency, the United 
Kingdom, presented to its EU colleagues the idea of a Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, which 
had originally been put forward by a number of UK-based NGOs, including Saferworld, British 
American Security Information Council (BASIC) and the World Development Movement.
11 In 
June 1998, after three months of intense negotiations in the Council’s COARM working group, 
the General Affairs Council formally adopted the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports which 
introduced criteria and guidelines to manage arms exports by EU Member States.
12   In December 
1998 a Joint Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons
 was also adopted.
13 It suggested objectives 
and  measures  to  combat  the  destabilizing  accumulation  and  spread  of  SALW  and  provided 
financial and technical assistance to specific actions in this field, including projects managed by 
the UN. With the adoption of these various agreements a more harmonized European approach to 
small arms started to materialize.  
 
                                                 
8 Belgium, France and the United Kingdom were singled out as the EU counties most implicated in this 
illicit trade in the region of Sub-Saharan Africa. See Saferworld, Undermining Development: The European 
Trade with the Horn of Africa and Central Africa, London: Saferworld, 1998. 
9  See  I.  Anthony,  “Appendix  8C-  European  Union  approaches  to  arms  control,  non-proliferation  and 
disarmament”,  Sipri Yearbook 2001: Stockholm. 
10 European Union Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms 
9057/97 DG E- CFSP IV, 26 June 1997. 
11 The UK had already shown its commitment to the SALW issue when in 1997 the newly elected Labour 
government adopted a comprehensive ban of handguns.  
12 European Union, EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, Council document 8675/2/98 Rev.2, Brussels, 8 
June 1998. On the Code of Conduct see also S. Bauer “The EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports – 
Enhancing the accountability of arms exports policies?”, European Security, vol.12, nos. 3-4, September-
December 2003, pp.129-147. 
13 See Joint Action of 17 December 1998 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on 
European Union on the European Union’s contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and 
spread of small arms and light weapons, 1999/34/CFSP, Official Journal of the European Communities, L 
9, 15 Jan 1999, pp.1-5.    6   
As  early  as  1999,  the  EU  also  began  to  support  UN  initiatives  to  create  a  legally  binding 
international instrument on the small arms trade and to convene an international conference on 
small arms.
14 With the adoption of an EU Plan of Action the EU made clear its priorities with 
regard to a future UN Conference on small arms.  These priorities included a commitment to 
international law and human rights, an emphasis on the link between security and development, 
the promotion of strict national legislation to sanction the illicit possession of small arms and the 
adoption of global standards for marking and tracing of SALW.
15 
 
The  EU’s  efforts  to  reach  an  international  agreement  on  small  arms  were  supported  by  the 
creation of the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), a global network of civil 
society  organizations  working  to  stop  the  proliferation  and  misuse  of  small  arms  and  light 
weapons. Founded in 1998, IANSA has grown  rapidly and has now  more than 700 member 
groups in over 100 countries.
16 It is composed of a wide range of organizations concerned with 
SALW,  including  policy  development  organizations,  national  gun  control  groups,  research 
institutes, aid agencies, faith groups, victims, human rights and community action organizations. 
The EU and IANSA first collective effort was to focus on the promotion of an UN conference on 
small arms which would introduce stringent international commitments (commitments consistent 
with the policies already adopted at the EU level). These two partners were backed by several 
states  including  Japan  and  Canada  which  also  believed  that  the  Conference  should  address 
broader questions of arms holding, inter-states transfer and assistance to countries in conflict.  
 
However, a number of UN Member States, including several Latin American, Asian and Middle 
Eastern  states  and  more  significantly  the  United  States,  were  more  apprehensive  about  the 
conclusion of international agreements on SALW. Several states, including the United States, 
visibly privileged national or regional approaches over the adoption of international guidelines 
17 
                                                 
14 See A/54/260. 
15 This Plan of Action was adopted under the French Presidency. In fact, France had already adopted a 
number of stronger transparency measures on arms exports, following the creation, in 1997, of the Quilès 
commission which investigated the question of French arms exports to Rwanda during the genocide.  The 
commission was a result of strong pressure from various elements of civil society, including some French 
NGOs, members of the media and a number of academics. See K. Krause “Multilateral Diplomacy, Norm 
Building, and UN Conferences: The Case of Small Arms and Light Weapons’, p.255, and M. McNulty 
“French arms, war and genocide in Rwanda”, Crime, Law and Social Change, vol.33. 2000, pp.105-120.  
16  See www.iansa.org 
17 See Small Arms Survey  “Chapter 5- Reaching  Consensus in New York:  the 2001 UN  Small Arms 
Conference”  ,  pp.209-210.  On  the  US  position,  see  L.Bondi,  “U.S.  Policy  on  Small  Arms  and  Light 
Weapons”, in J. Boutwell and M.T. Klare, Light Weapons and Civil Conflict. Controlling the Tools of 
Violence, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 1999, p.163.   7   
and made it clear that a UN conference should only focus on the illicit, and not the legal, trade of 
small arms.  
 
Despite this unenthusiastic support of several UN members, the United Nations Conference on 
the Illicit Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Aspects opened in New York on 9 July 
2001. A few weeks before the beginning of this Conference, the European Commission, with the 
support of the Swedish Presidency, published a report entitled Small Arms and Light Weapons- 
The response of the European Union which clearly stated the EU’s objectives for the UN Small 
Arms Conference.
18 The EU championed the implementation of international exports controls and 
principles, the development of international instruments on marking and tracing and on arms 
brokering. It also emphasized two controversial issues: the need to address the issues of civilian 
possession and transfer to non-state groups.
19  
 
Negotiations  were  extremely  difficult  at  the  Conference.  The  Americans  remained  extremely 
critical of the negotiations and on most issues the EU and American positions were diametrically 
opposed. The US refused to support an international agreement which would focus on the legal 
trade and manufacturing of SALW, regulate small arms transfer to non-state actors or prohibit 
civilian possession. It also rejected any discussion on the possibility of a follow-up conference.
20 
The African bloc, the region most affected by the proliferation of small arms, also refused to 
comprise on the issue of civilian possession and transfers to non-state actors.  In contrast, with the 
view  of  achieving  consensus,  the  EU  gradually  agreed  to  abandon  some  of  its  priorities.
21 
Throughout the negotiations, these priorities had been endorsed by IANSA. Indeed, the UN Small 
Arms  Conference  was  the  first  international  meeting  in  which  IANSA  played  a  major  role. 
However,  IANSA’s  contribution  to  the  negotiation  was  undermined  by  criticism  regarding 
coordination problems and the network’s inability to adequately respond to the very effective gun 
lobby and particularly, to the American National Rifle Association (NRA).
22 
 
                                                 
18  European  Commission  Small  Arms  and  Light  Weapons-  The  response  of  the  European  Union, 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2001.  
19  See Statement by Louis Michel on behalf of the EU at the Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms 
and Light Weapons in all its Aspects. New York, 9
th July 2001. 
20  Statement by John R. Bolton, US Under-Secretary for State for Arms Control and International Security, 
UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects, July  9 2001. 
21  See O. Greene “The 2001 UN Conference: A Useful Step Forward?” SAIS Review, vol.XXII, no.1, 2002, 
p.199. 
22 Interview with UN official, UN department of Disarmament Affairs. 1
st July 2006, New York; Interview 
with NGO official, 3
rd July 2006, New York. Interview with NGO Official. 18
th February 2007, Oxford.   8   
 
Negotiations concluded at 6.00 am on Saturday 21 July, when the African countries finally gave 
in  and  the  United  States  agreed  to  support  a  follow-up  Review  Conference.
23  A  politically 
(although not legally) binding document, the Programme of Action (PoA) to Prevent, Combat and 
Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, was adopted by 
consensus later that same day. It suggested a broad set of measures to tackle the illicit trade of 
SALW. Several international actors, including the EU welcomed the adoption of the Programme 
of Action (PoA) but also insisted that stronger commitments and efforts were needed from the 
international community in order to truly stop the proliferation of SALW. A Review Conference 
of the Programme of Action was planned for 2006. This Conference would constitute a crucial 
opportunity for the UN Member states to strengthen their commitment on SALW and provide 
another chance for the European Union and the NGOs to reaffirm their partnership.  
 
2- The European Union and NGOs at the 2006 Review Conference: an evolving 
coalition in a multilevel game. 
 
To grasp the relationship between the  EU and  NGOs (under the umbrella of IANSA) at the 
Review Conference, one needs to use an analytical approach that takes into account not only the 
complex  nature  of  the  EU  as  an  international  actor,  but  also  the  growing  role  of  NGOs  in 
international negotiations. The academic literature on the EU as a global actor has been very 
fertile in recent years.
24 However, few theorists have attempted to examine the EU as a global 
actor.
25 Furthermore, the partnership between the EU and NGOs in international negotiations has 
                                                 
23  In  his  final  statement,  the  President  of  the  Conference  expressed  his  “disappointment  over  the 
Conference’s  inability  to  agree,  due  to  the  concerns  of  one  state  [the  United  States],  on  language 
recognizing the need to establish and maintain control over private ownership of these deadly weapons and 
the need for preventing sales of such arms to non-state group”. See United Nations, Annex- Statement by 
the President of the Conference after the adoption of the Programme of Action to Prevent and Eradicate the 
Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its aspects. Report of the United Nations Conference 
on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light  Weapons in All its  Aspects, New York, 9-20 July 2001. 
A/CONF.192/15 
24   See recent works by   C. Hill  and  M. Smith (eds.) International  Relations and  the  European 
Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.; S. Marsh and H. Mackenstein, The International Relations 
of  the  European  Union,  Harlow:  Pearson  Longman,  2005.;  W.  Carlsnaes  et  al.  (eds.),  Contemporary 
European Foreign Policy, London: Sage Publishers, 2004: B.Tonra and T. Christansen (eds.), Rethinking 
European  Foreign  Policy,  London:  Sage  Publishers,  2004.;  K.  Smith,  European  Foreign  Policy  in  a 
Changing  World,  Cambridge:  Polity  Press  2003;  R.  Ginsberg,  The  European  Union  in  International 
Politics:  Baptism  by  Fire,  Lanham:  Rowman  and  Littlefield  Publishers,  2001  and  C.  Bretherton  and 
J.Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor, London: Routledge, 1999.   
25   See K.E. Jørgensen, “European Foreign Policy: Conceptualising the Domain” in W. Carlsneas, 
H.Surjsen, B. White (eds) Contemporary European Foreign Policy, London: Sage, 2004, pp.32-56.   9   
been mostly overlooked. This paper argues that a fruitful analysis of the relationship between EU 
and  NGOs  in  international  negotiations  requires  the  understanding  of  the  ways  in  which  a 
complex web of actors and institutions interact. In this next section, we propose an analytical 
framework  that  combines  a  multilevel  game  approach  with  concepts  from  the  literature  on 
coalition of middle powers and NGOs to examine EU-NGOs relations at the 2006 Small Arms 
Review Conference. 
 
2.1  The EU and NGOs in international negotiations: a multilevel game approach 
 
The  study  of  the  European  Union  as  an  international  actor  has  challenged  both  European 
integration  and  International  Relations  theorists.
26  European  integration  scholars  have  mostly 
been interested in the development of general theories of economic and political integration and 
in the explanation of the EU internal developments
27; they did not originally seek to explain the 
behaviour  of  the  EU  in  international  politics.
28  In  contrast,  mainstream  IR  theories  examine 
relations and cooperation between states in the international system and are usually concerned 
with producing general models of states’ behaviour at the international level. The EU as a global 
actor  represents  a  double  challenge  for  IR  theorists:  it  is  neither  a  state,  nor  a  typical 
intergovernmental  organization.  Furthermore  IR  theories  also  tend  to  assume  that  states  are 
rational  “unitary”  actors  with  fixed  preferences  and  the  ability  to  adopt  various  strategies  to 
achieve their preferred outcomes. Yet, it is difficult to consider the EU as a unitary actor in the 
international system, especially in the context of UN negotiations. First, the EU is not a member 
of the UN and the EU Member States remain the main players. Second, various EU actors, as 
well as different levels of decision-making, need to be considered to understand the behaviour of 
the EU as an actor at the UN.
29 
  
Some scholars, such as Robert D. Putnam, have argued that international agreements should be 
viewed  as  the  product  of  a  multilevel  game  which  involves  a  complex  web  of  actors  and 
                                                 
26 See B. Tonra and T. Christiansen “The Study of EU foreign policy: between international relations and 
European studies” in B. Tonra and C. Christiansen (eds.), Rethinking European Foreign Policy, 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004, pp.1-9. 
27  F.  Andreatta  “Theory  and  the  European  Union’s  International  Relations”  in  C.  Hill  and  M.  Smith, 
International Relations and the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p.23. 
28  M.  Pollack  “International  Relations  Theory  and  European  Integration”,  Journal  of  Common  Market 
Studies, 2001, vol.39, no.2, p.222. 
29 See M. Farrell,  “EU Representation and Coordination within the United Nations” in K.V. Laatikainen 
and K.E. Smith (eds.), Intersecting Multilateralism: The European Union at the United Nations, London: 
Palgrave , 2006, pp. 33-36.   10   
institutions.
30  As  Moravcsik  stresses,  the  multilevel  game  approach  depicts  diplomacy  as  “a 
process of strategic interactions in which actors simultaneously try to take into account of and, if 
possible, influence the expected reactions of other actors, both at home and abroad”.
31  This paper 
argues that a multilevel games metaphor provides a valuable framework not only to examine the 
EU as an actor in SALW negotiations, but also to explore the EU relationship with NGOs. 
 
 
The multilevel game approach was developed by Putnam who first put forward the idea of a 
“two-level game” metaphor. With this metaphor, Putnam wished to address the shortcomings of 
the  existing  literature  on  the  relations  between  domestics  and  international  affairs.
32  Putnam 
argues that international negotiations should be decomposed into two different stages. The first 
stage consists of negotiations to achieve a provisional agreement at the international level (Level 
I). The second stage entails negotiations at the domestic level (Level II) within various groups 
about whether to accept, or ratify, the provisional agreement.  In this two-level game, each side is 
represented by a “chief negotiator”, or “chief of government” (COG), who plays at two levels.
33 
Putnam’s metaphor implies that the two games are played simultaneously. Decisions taken at one 
level can have a direct effect on negotiations at the other level. Thus, strategies and outcomes at 
different levels of the game simultaneously affect one another.
34  
 
According to Putnam, the crucial link between international negotiations and domestic politics 
lies in the necessity of ratification; in order for negotiations to be successful, the chief negotiator 
must not only reach an agreement at the international level but also assure that the agreement will 
be accepted, or ratified, at the domestic level.  Final ratification of an agreement must be voted up 
or down by the constituents at the domestic level. Any modification to the agreement achieved at 
Level I is considered as a rejection of the agreement. Putnam defines “win-sets” as the sets of all 
                                                 
30  See  R.D.  Putnam,  “  Diplomacy  and  domestic  politics:  the  logic  of  two-level  games”,  International 
Organization, 42,3, 1988, pp.427-460. 
31A.  Moravcsik    “Introduction:  International  Bargaining  and  Domestic  Theories  of  International 
Bargaining” in P.B Evans et al. (eds.), Double-Edged Diplomacy- International Bargaining and Domestic 
Politics, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p.15 
32 Putnam argues that international negotiations have been examined either in terms of domestic causes on 
international  effects  or  of  international  causes  and  domestic  effects.  However,  both  approaches  only 
represent “partial equilibrium” analysis and “miss an important part of the story, namely how the domestic 
politics of several countries [become] entangled via international negotiations”. See Putnam, op. cit., p.430. 
33 See P.Evans, “Building an Integrative Approach to International and Domestic Politics” in P, Evans et 
al., Double-Edged Diplomacy. International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1993, p.399. 
34 L. A. Patterson, “Agricultural policy reform in the European Community: a three-level game analysis”…, 
p.142.   11   
possible Level I agreements that would gain the necessary majority among the constituents when 
voted  up  or  down,  thus  that  would  be  ratified  by  domestic  constituents.  Agreements  at  the 
international level will only be possible if in the Level II win-sets of each of the parties of the 
agreement overlap. The larger the win-sets, the more likely they may overlap; conversely, the 
smaller the win-sets, the greater the chance that negotiations will fail.
 35 
  
The  two-level  game  metaphor  has  been  used  to  analyze  a  number  of  cases  of  international 
bargaining and several authors have applied Putnam’s two-level metaphor to the analysis of the 
EU’s external relation.
36 In most of these analyses, the two-level game metaphor was adapted to 
become  a  three-level  game  metaphor.
37  Putnam  himself  acknowledges  that  examining  the 
European Union involves not just a two-level game, but a three-level game.
38 The three levels can 
be defined as follows: Level I remains the international level, or in our case the UN level. Level II 
becomes the European Union level, where negotiations mainly take place in EU institutions and 
involve various EU actors. Finally, the third level is the domestic level. 
 
Collinson points out that the key EU negotiators at Level I are not always the same individuals 
playing at Level II and Level III. In addition, negotiations at Level I may involve more than one 
actor and each one may represent different interests (as in the case of the Member State holding 
the  EU  Presidency).
39  This  paper  recognizes  that  the  variation  of  negotiator  does  pose  an 
                                                 
35 R.D. Putnam, op.cit., pp.437-438. 
36 See H. Hubel “The EU’s Three-Level Game in Dealing with Neighbours”, European Foreign Affairs 
Review, 9, 2004, pp.347-362.;  S. Meunier, “What Single Voice? The European Institutions and EU-US 
Trade Negotiations”, International Organization, 54,1, 2000, pp.103-135; S. Collinson, ““Issue-systems”, 
“multilevel games” and the analysis of the EU’s external commercial and associated policies: a research 
agenda”, Journal of European Public Policy, 6:2, 1999, pp.206-224; L.A. Patterson, “Agricultural policy 
reform in the European Community: a three-level game analysis”, International Organization, 51,1, 1997, 
pp.135-165., and J.S.Odell, “International Threats and Internal Politics. Brazil, the European Community 
and the United States, 1985-1987” in P.B. Evans, H. K. Jacobson and R. D. Putnam (eds.) Double-Edged 
Diplomacy.  International  Bargaining  and  Domestic  Politics,  Berkeley:  University  of  California  Press, 
1993, pp.233-264. 
37  It should be noted that some authors have opted to keep the two-level game metaphor, viewing the EU 
as  the  “domestic  level”  or  proposed  a  double  two-level  game.  See  e.g.,  Y.Devuyst,  “The  European 
Community and the Conclusion of the Uruguay Round”, in C. Rhodes and S. Mazey (eds.) State of the 
European Community, Vol.3, Building a European Polity?, Boulder: Lynne-Rienner, pp.449-467, and A.R. 
Young, “What game? By which rules? Adaptation and flexibility in the EC’s foreign economic policy” in 
M.  Knodt  and  S.  Princen  (eds)  Understanding  the  European  Union’s  External  Relations,  London: 
Routledge, 2003, pp.54-71.  
38 R.D. Putnam, “Two-Level Games: The Impact of Domestic Politics on Transatlantic Bargaining” in H. 
Haftendorn and C. Tuschhoff, America and Europe in an Era of Change”, Boulder: Westview Press, 1993, 
p.80. 
39 S. Collinson “Issue-systems”, “multilevel games” and the analysis of the EU’s external commercial and 
associated policies: a research agenda”,  Journal of European Public Policy, 6:2, 1999:, pp.206-224.   12   
analytical problem, but only if the dynamics of the three-level games are different from the two-
level game. To overcome this obstacle, one must make sure that the links between the three levels 
of negotiations are still present.  
 
This paper suggests that officials from foreign ministries constitute the interface between the 
three levels of negotiations. At the United Nations (our Level I), the proliferation of SALW has 
been debated in various forums, including the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and 
UN-sponsored conferences. The task of representing the EU at the UNGA and UN conferences 
falls on the Member State exercising the EU Presidency,
40 but all EU Member States are also 
represented by their own delegations composed of individuals usually working for the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.   
 
At the EU level  small arms issues are generally dealt within General Affairs and External Affairs 
Council and within several working groups including CONUN (the working group on the UN)
41, 
CODUN  (working  group  on  global  disarmament  issues)  and  COARM  (working  group  on 
conventional weapons). All these working groups are attended by senior officials from the foreign 
affairs ministries.
42 Finally, at the domestic level, the decision-making process on SALW issues 
involves  various  actors.    The  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  the  Ministry  of  Defence  and  the 
Ministry responsible for aid and development programs might all be involved in negotiations on 
small arms and light weapons at the domestic level.
43 
 
The multilevel game literature has been criticized by both rationalists and constructivists. One of 
the  main  criticisms  is  that  the  two-level  game  approach  is  not  a  theory.  Putnam  fully 
acknowledges  that  his  two-level  game  approach  is  a  metaphor  more  than  a  fully  developed 
theory.
44 As Moravcsik has highlighted, in order for this metaphor to become a more formal 
theoretical model, some definitions and specifications about domestic politics, the environment of 
                                                 
40  See  J.  Dedring  “Reflections  of  the  coordination  of  the  EU  member  states  in  organs  of  the  United 
Nations”, CFSP Forum, Vol. 2, No. 1, January 2004, p.2.  
41 See R. Baratta, “Overlaps between European Community Competence and European Union Foreign 
Policy Activity” in E. Cannizzaro (ed.) The European Union as an Actor in International Relations, The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002, pp.51-75. and  P. Luif, EU Cohesion in the UN General Assembly, 
Occasional Papers no.49, Paris: Institute for Security Studies, December 2003, p.11 and 16. 
42  D.  Feakes,  “The  Emerging  European  Disarmament  and  Non-Proliferation  Agenda  on  Chemical  and 
Biological Weapons”, Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No.65, July-August 2002, p.3.  
43 Miller argues that at this level of negotiation, the main goal of negotiations is generally to produce a 
position that will be accepted by each of these departments. See Miller “Politics over Promise. Domestic 
Impediments to Arms Control” International Security, vol. 8, no.4, 1984, p.80.  
44 Putnam, op.cit.., p.435.   13   
the international negotiations and the negotiators’ preferences are needed.
45 Nevertheless, this 
paper argues that this metaphor offers a valuable framework, not only to organise the data and 
understand how domestic and international factors are intertwined in international negotiations, 
but also to examine the EU’s interactions with NGOs in UN negotiations and identify at which 
level of negotiations these interactions have occurred.  
 
2.2 The European Union, NGOs and the coalition literature 
 
While  the  multilevel  game  approach  examines  domestic  and  international  factors  which  can 
influence international negotiations, it does not specifically focus on the relationship between 
states and non-governmental organizations in international negotiations. Putnam acknowledges 
that “transnational alignments” may emerge during international negotiations but does not fully 
explore the idea of transnational alliances between players.
46 Moravcsik stresses that the role of 
transnational alliances should be taken into account in a multilevel game approach. He argues that 
in the two-level game metaphor, groups at the domestic levels can also adopt two-level strategies, 
suggesting that a “transnational alliance”, which occurs when various domestic groups in more 
than one country decide to cooperate to influence international negotiations, can strengthen or 
undermine domestic support of the position of the chief of governments (COGs).
47 Yet, in order 
to convincingly grasp and analyze EU-NGOs relations at the SALW Review Conference, this 
paper argues that the multilevel game approach needs to be combined with some concepts from 
the literature on coalitions of middle powers and NGOs.
48  
  
2.2.1 New diplomacy, middle power and public opinion 
 
The literature on “new diplomacy” offers an interesting insight into why states decide to form 
coalitions with other states, but also  with non-governmental organizations. Broadly speaking, 
                                                 
45  A.  Moravcsik,  “Introduction:  International  Bargaining  and  Domestic  Theories  of  International 
Bargaining” in P.B Evans et al. (eds), Double-Edged Diplomacy- International Bargaining and Domestic 
Politics, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p.23. 
46 See Putnam, op.cit., p.444  and p.459 
47 Moravcsik, op. cit., pp.31-32 
48 There  is another wave of international relations scholarship, which sought to combine constructivist 
insights about the role of norms with a more sophisticated understanding of agency and the role of domestic 
structures (among others Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, 1999; Checkel, 1999, 2001, 
2002,  2005;  Lewis,  2005;  Risse,  2000;  and  Sikkink  (2004).  This  literature  has  been  very  creative  in 
suggesting concepts such as “transnational advocacy networks”, the “boomerang pattern” or the “spiral 
model”. Its empirical counterpart has been, however, more diffuse.   14   
‘new diplomacy’ refers to flexible and faster ways of dealing with international negotiations than 
traditional diplomacy. These processes have taken place particularly in negotiations about human 
security topics in the last two decades and have been mainly lead by countries characterized as 
“middle powers”.
49 The end of the Cold War allowed these middle powers to play a larger role on 
security issues and form new alliances with other countries, as well as with NGOs, that share their 
ideas and objectives. Indeed, confronted with “hesitancy or opposition to a more comprehensive 
solution of the humanitarian problems… middle and even small states stepped forward and took 
the opportunity to lead […] international processes  […] in areas of traditional middle power 
expertise  (...)  such  as  peacekeeping  and  peace  building,  human  rights  and  environmental 
protection”.
50 
 
The most significant example of “new diplomacy” can be found in the negotiations surrounding 
the  treaty  banning  the  use  of  anti-personnel  landmines  in  the  late  1990s.  During  these 
negotiations Canada (supported by a group of like-minded middle and small states) chose to exert 
leadership. The like-minded countries avoided the consensus-based forum of the UN and opted 
for  an  alternative  negotiating  process  in  defiance  of  the  great  powers’  preferences.  The 
undertaking of this more activist leadership role by Canada was made possible by two factors: the 
role of particular individuals and the strong cooperation with NGOs.
51 These two factors are 
significant  to  explain  the  ability  of  middle  powers  to  play  prominent  international  roles  and 
engage in this “new diplomacy”. For example, in the landmines case, the role played by the 
Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy was essential. Axworthy used “the partnership with 
NGOs to enhance Canada’s position internationally and gain recognition and renewed prestige for 
his country” and to reassert the identity of Canadians as “good world citizens”.
52 In the case of 
negotiations on SALW at the  United  Nations in the late 1990s, the European  Union seemed 
inclined to follow a similar path as Canada in the landmines case.  
 
Regarding the concept of middle power, “its definition remains vague and ranges from indicators 
of economic power such as GNP and GNP per capita to behavioural patterns such as the states’ 
                                                 
49 One of the most well-known examples is the coalition to ban land-mines, which led to foreign policy 
initiatives that focused on the security of civilians in situations of armed conflict  See McRae and Hubert 
(2001) in McRae, Robert and Don Hubert, Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, 
Promoting Peace, McGill-Queen's University Press, Canada, 2001. 
50 See M. H. Petrova. Leadership competition and the creation of norms: a crossnational study of weapons 
restrictions. Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Cornell University in Partial 
Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, 2007, p. 30, 32. 
51 See M. H. Petrova, op. cit.  
52 Petrova, op. cit.  pp. 321-22; 34.   15   
tendency  to  pursue  multilateral  solutions  to  international  problems,  tendency  to  embrace 
compromise  positions  in  international  disputes,  and  tendency  to  embrace  notions  of  ‘good 
international citizenship’ to guide their behaviour”.
53 We do not claim here that the  EU is a 
middle power. The EU is composed of several middle powers, but also second-tier powers (i.e. 
France, Germany and the UK).
54 In fact, countries such as France and the UK “ha[ve] not based 
their international image on performing ‘middle power’ roles, but rather on their great power 
status  enshrined  in  their  UN  Security  Council  permanent  membership.”
55  Nevertheless,  one 
should recognize that an important number of EU countries are considered as middle powers 
(including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Netherlands, Romania, Poland, Spain and 
Sweden) and may influence the EU to act as “middle powers” in international negotiations. 
  
The EU as an international actor does seem to display some characteristics generally associated 
with middle powers. According to Cooper, during the Cold War “middle powers” engaged in 
routine (quiet, low-key, consensus-oriented) diplomacy.
56 “These roles were dictated both by self-
interests and a desire to gain international prestige and distinguish themselves from the great 
                                                 
53 Cooper, Andrew F., Richard A. Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers: Australia 
and Canada in a Changing World Order. Vancouver: UBC Press, 1993 (Quoted in Petrova, op. cit. p. 31). 
“The concept originated after the end of WWII during the founding of the UN when states such as Canada, 
Australia, and the Netherlands sought recognition of their status as middle powers -not great powers but 
neither small ones- and  the greater influence  in  international  affairs  such  a status  would bestow upon 
them.” (Petrova, op. cit. p. 31). Thus, under the original sense of the term, a middle power was one that had 
some degree of influence globally, but not dominance over any one area  For more detailed discussions on 
the concept of “middle power,” see D. Stairs, “Of Medium Powers and Middling Roles,” in Ken Booth 
(ed.) Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
and M. Royds, “Middlepowerism in the Post-Cold War Era: A Critique of Axworthy’s Security Policy,” 
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Vol. 3(1), 2000. 
54 Brian Wood offers a list of Middle Powers in 1988 which includes  Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, 
Canada, the former Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, 
Netherlands,  Nigeria,  Norway,  Pakistan,  Poland,  Romania,  Saudi  Arabia,  South  Africa,  South  Korea, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Venezuela, the former Yugoslavia. See B Wood, The Middle Powers 
and the General Interest, Middle Powers and the International System. The North-South Institute, Ottawa, 
Canada, 1988, p.17. For the purposes of this paper, the term 'second-tier' states will be used to identify 
those states who are not influent enough to be considered as a superpower, but that are arguably more 
important than the classical middle powers in the international system. By way of illustration, Austria could 
be an ideal 'middle power', the UK a 'second-tier' state and the US the current 'superpower'. Similarly, 
Petrova (2007: 50) uses the examples of the UK and France as second tier power, the US as great power, 
Canada and Norway as middle powers and Belgium as small power. 
55 Petrova, op. cit. 18. See also V. Danilovic, When the Stakes Are High - Deterrence and Conflict among 
Major Powers, University of Michigan Press, 2002; Kennedy, P, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, 
Random House, 1987. 
56 A. Cooper “Niche Diplomacy: A Conceptual Overview,” in Andrew F. Cooper (ed.) Niche Diplomacy: 
Middle Powers after the Cold War, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997, pp. 1-24.   16   
powers”.
57 As  middle powers, “those states  were affluent but militarily weak and thus had a 
vested interest in preserving a stable and peaceful world order”.
58 These states also started to 
embrace stronger humanitarian values.  
 
With the end of the Cold War, authorities in most European countries increasingly tented to adopt 
humanitarian values instead of military values. Following Petrova, we argue that most military 
authorities  in  EU  Member  States  would  have  embraced  these  humanitarian  values,  which 
included the renunciation of weapons that cause severe humanitarian harm to civilians (such as 
anti-personnel landmines and the regulation of the illicit trade of small arms).
59 
  
Whereas in great powers, such as the United States, military values and institutions might be 
supported by public opinion, in middle powers societal attitudes may also influence the military 
authorities in a different way; military authorities would potentially find it difficult to defend the 
continued use of weapons stigmatized by public opinion.
60 Public opinion could therefore directly 
affect negotiations at the domestic level (i.e. the third level in a multilevel game). Furthermore, in 
the  second-tier  states,  some  have  argued  that  the  promotion  of  these  humanitarian  norms 
restricting  the  use  of  conventional  weapons  such  as  SALW  has  also  been  facilitated  by 
governments on the left of the political spectrum.
61 
 
2.2.2 Middle powers and NGOs: natural allies? 
 
As we have seen, “new diplomacy” processed have been lead by coalitions of middle powers with 
NGOs. Why would middle powers decide to form a coalition which other states and with NGOs? 
What would they gain and what would they risk by forming these coalitions?  
 
                                                 
57 Petrova, op. cit. 31. See also L. Neack, “Middle Powers Once Removed: The Diminished Global Role of 
Middle  Powers  and American Grand Strategy”, paper presented at  the 41st  Annual  Convention of  the 
International  Studies  Association,  Los  Angeles,  CA,  March  14-18,  2000, 
http://www.ciaonet.org/isa/nal01/index.html S. Roussel, and C.-P. David “‘Middle Power Blues’: Canadian 
Policy and International Security after the Cold War”, American Review of Canadian Studies 28 (1/2), 
1998, pp.131-156. Both quoted in Petrova, op. cit. p. 31. 
58 Petrova, op. cit. p. 32. 
59 Petrova, op. cit.  
60 See Cooper, op cit. and Petrova op. cit. 
61 See Hubert (2000) for the importance of the Left governments in France and Britain when negotiating the 
landmines treaty. D. Hubert,“The Landmine Ban: A Case Study in Humanitarian Advocacy”, Occasional 
Paper  42,  Thomas  J.  Watson  Jr.  Institute  for  International  Studies,  Brown  University,  2000: 
http://www.watsoninstitute.org/pub/op42.pdf Also Petrova mentions this issue (see e.g. op. cit. p. 29).   17   
Petrova argues that middle powers expect short-term, mid-term, and long term dividends from 
taking up the risks and costs of creating coalition and leading negotiations.
62 Thus, “the short-
term benefits consist mainly in the ability of the leading states to steer the negotiations in their 
preferred direction and have greater influence of their final outcome.  The  midterm dividends 
include the ability to translate the newly gained political capital and prestige into leverage in 
other issue areas. Finally, the long-term dividends (...) come from their enhanced international 
status.”
63 They can also increase their ability to redraw further the international agenda towards 
including “issues in which middle power states have a comparative advantage and on which they 
have already asserted their leadership ambitions”.
64  
 
In contrast, middle powers have to face the financial costs and expending resources associated 
with organizing international conferences, lobbying other states or contributing to funding field 
operations in order to match their rhetorical and financial supports.
65 “The leading states also take 
the risk of loss of prestige in the case of failure of their initiative, and the risk of punishment by 
the great power for going against its interests.”
66  
 
These  costs  are  often  eclipsed  by  the  perception  that  NGO  pressure  and  the  possibility  of 
building a coalition with NGOs and with other countries would create higher benefits than costs. 
Indeed, as NGO advocacy grows and spurs more national support for their cause, the risks of 
assuming leadership are lowered.
67 On the one hand, the states acquire allies which somehow 
represent  (international)  public  opinion  and  hold  'moral  authority'.  On  the  other  hand,  their 
chances of success increase by the constitution of a stronger coalition.  
 
Finally,  in  an  “ideal  new  diplomacy  processes”,  there  is  a  facilitating  condition  that  reduces 
transaction costs: “the shared background of [some] key individuals in policy-making positions 
and NGO activists facilitates communication between the two sides of the like-minded coalition. 
Importantly, this commonality in interests and ideas among policy-makers and NGOs is made 
                                                 
62  See Petrova, op. cit. pp. 26-37. 
63 Petrova, op. cit. p. 34.  
64 Petrova, op. cit. p. 34. We agree with Petrova, in that the promotion of the “human security” agenda 
internationally by Canada and a number of other middle powers (particularly European) could be seen as 
“an attempt to solidify their authority and legitimize their greater role in international politics.” Petrova, op. 
cit. p. 35. See also A. Chapnik, “The Canadian Middle Power Myth”, International Journal 55 (2), 2000. 
pp.188—206. 
65 Petrova, op. cit. p.34, fn. 37.  
66 Petrova, op. cit. p. 34, fn. 37. 
67 See also Petrova op cit. p. 35 for the case of Norway and the negotiations on cluster munitions.   18   
possible by opening of government positions to former NGO members.”
68 That has happened 
mostly in Scandinavian countries, but also in other countries such as Belgium and the UK.
69 
 
 3- The United Nations Small Arms Review Conference 2006 
 
In this section, we use our proposed analytical framework to examine the EU relationship with 
NGOs during the negotiations at Review Conference and at its Preparatory Committee. All three 
levels of negotiations (UN, EU and domestic) are analyzed to identify the factors that might have 
influenced the EU and the NGOs mutual success during the negotiations.  
 
￿  Level I (UN)  negotiations  
 
The Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) of the Small Arms Review Conference met in New York 
in January 2006. Negotiations on the preparation of a Review Conference were difficult and both 
the EU and IANSA multiplied their efforts to convince other states to support the adoption of 
strong  international  commitments.  Prior  to  that  meeting,  the  Chair,  Ambassador  Rowe  from 
Sierra  Leone  held  several  informal  consultations  in  New  York  and  Geneva,  defining  six 
“clusters” on which negotiations would focus: 1) Human/humanitarian, socio-economic and other 
dimensions,  2)Norms,  regulations  and  administrative  procedures,  3)  Excessive  accumulation, 
misuse and uncontrolled spread, 4) International cooperation and assistance, 5)  Communication, 
and 6)Follow-up and reporting mechanisms.   
 
At  the  PrepCom,  the  EU  presented  its  Strategy  to  combat  the  illicit  accumulation  and  the 
trafficking of SALW and their ammunitions which had been adopted by the European Council in 
December 2005. In the framework of the PoA, the Strategy supported the adoption of a legally 
                                                 
68 Petrova, op. cit. p. 9. 
69  The case of Norway illustrates nicely this idea, as the number of people in the different departments of 
the Norwegian government coming from the associative terrain is the highest in Western Europe (Petrova, 
op. cit. p. 295). Two examples: First, Jan Egeland, former president of the Norwegian section of Amnesty 
International and former member of the Internatinoal Committee of the Red Cross, was in 1990 adviser to 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs and later Junior Minister of Foreign Affairs; from this position he was 
partially responsible for the role of leadership by Norway in the landmine negotiations during the 90s. 
Currently he is UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs. Second, Jonas Gahr Store, former 
Secretary General of the Norwegian section of the Red Cross and is the current Minister for Foreign Affairs 
Also Petrova (2007) mentions these two examples (e.g. in p. 299, 318 or 381) and details their individual 
role in different stages of the landmines and cluster munitions processes. See also Mark Leonard y Andrew 
Small,  Norwegian  Public  Diplomacy,  The  Foreign  Policy  Centre,  London,  2003 
(http://www.dep.no/archive/udvedlegg/01/06/ml10_018.pdf).   19   
binding international agreement on the tracing and marking of SALW, the creation of a group of 
experts on brokering, the strengthening of exports control and the inclusion of minimum common 
international criteria and guidelines for controls on small arms transfers.
70 However, what also 
transpired at the PrepCom is that several EU Member States had their own priorities. On the one 
hand, France and Germany emphasized the need to combat the illicit trade of ammunitions.
71 On 
the  other  hand,  the  Netherlands  and  the  UK  presented  a  working  paper  on  the  negative 
humanitarian and development impact of the illicit trade of small arms and recommended that the 
link  between  SALW  and  development  be  clearly  spelled  out  in  the  final  document  of  the 
Conference.
72 
 
The EU Member States were also well aware that the Review Conference would not initiate a 
renegotiation of the PoA and with the support of the United States and the League of Arab States 
the EU insisted that the “goal of the Review Conference [was] not to renegotiate or re-open the 
existing  Programme  of  Action”  but  rather  to  complement  or  enhance  the  PoA  and  its 
implementation.
73 Despite this general agreement, negotiations remained difficult at the PrepCom 
with  a  number  of  states  including  the  United  States,  Iran,  Israel  and  Egypt  refusing  to 
compromise on certain issues. 
 
IANSA  got  directly  involved  in  the  negotiations  regarding  the  organization  of  the  Review 
Conference.  The NGOs’ input and their support for the EU’s position became crucial during the 
negotiations of PrepCom. IANSA had been especially active since the 2001 UN Conference. It 
had participated in the negotiations of the Firearms Protocol and in many regional conferences 
which achieved positive results, such as the legally binding ECOWAS
74 convention on SALW. In 
addition, IANSA had joined the EU’s efforts to promote the idea of a global arms treaty. In 
October  2005,  parallel  to  the  UN  small  arms  process,  the  EU  supported  the  idea  of  an 
                                                 
70 See EU Strategy to combat the illicit accumulation and the trafficking of small arms and light weapons 
and  their  ammunition  (Adopted  by  the  European  Council  on  15-16  December  2005).  Preparatory 
Committee for the United Nations Conference to  Review  Progress Made  in the Implementation of the 
Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons 
in All Its Aspects, New York, 9-20 January 2006, 17 January 2006, A/CONF.192/2006?PC/CR.14.  
71 See A/CONF.192/2006/PC/CRP.12  
72  See A/CONF.192/2006/PC/ WP.2 
73 See Statement by Dorethea Auer, Austria, on behalf of the European Union, General Debate, Preparatory 
Committee for the United Nations Conference to  Review  Progress Made  in the Implementation of the 
Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons 
in All Its Aspects, New York, 9 January 2006.  
74 Economic Community of West African States   20   
international treaty to establish common standards for the global trade in conventional arms.
75 If 
the  process  around  the  Programme  of  Action  was  complex  and  multidimensional,  including 
several national, regional and global initiatives, the call for an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) was a 
single-issued campaign which did not necessarily limits its scope to the UN fora..
76 In 2003, the 
global  Control  Arms  Campaign  was  launched  by  three  UK-based  NGOs:  Oxfam,  Amnesty 
International and IANSA to support the Arms Trade Treaty.
77 The campaign was lead by three 
big organizations which complemented each other. On the one hand, IANSA is a coalition of 
hundreds of NGOs, most of them small, grass-roots, working on very different kinds of projects 
and from many different places. On the other hand, both Amnesty International and Oxfam have 
international prestige, reputation, contacts among the press and International Organisations - such 
as the EU or different UN departments - and many potential supporters to mobilize.
78 The Control 
Arms campaign put further pressure on states to address the SALW trade issue at the UN.   
 
Negotiations at the PrepCom ended on 20
 January without agreement on a final draft to forward 
to the Review Conference. The Chairman produced a conference room paper, but was unable to 
gain support for its incorporation into the final document
79; only texts of an organizational nature 
were adopted and forwarded to the officers of the Review Conference.
80 
 
The 2006 United Nations Conference to Review the Implementation of the UN Programme of 
Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons in 
                                                 
75  The  idea  of  an  international  Arms  Trade  Treaty  was  first  put  forward  by  a  group  of  Nobel  Peace 
Laureates in 1995 with the aim of limiting the spread and misuse of conventional arms. The ATT would 
create legally binding  controls and  international  standards on arms trade. The  EU highlighted  that  the 
United Nations was the only forum which could deliver this treaty and called for the start of a formal 
process  at  the  UN  at  the  earliest  opportunity.  See  Council  of  European  Union,  Press  Release,  2678
th 
Council Meeting – General Affairs and External Affairs, Luxembourg, 3 October 2005, 12514/05.  
76 In fact and because of the slow and bureaucratic characteristics of the UN processes on disarmament 
issues, the idea of engaging in an alternative process similar to the Ottawa Process for the landmines case, 
was envisaged as a real possibility by the NGOs. Interview with NGO official (2), 5
th July 2006 in New 
York. 
77 See www.controlarms.org 
78Despite Amnesty International and OXAM are both formally members of IANSA, the creation of the 
Control Arms campaign meant that both organizations decided to use a huge amount of time and resources 
to the issue of the ATT, which from that moment became one of the top priorities for these international 
organizations. In the words of an NGO official:  “Oxfam and Amnesty are the two organizations that have 
taken the initiative and that have the possibility of mobilizing more resources and, at least theoretically, 
millions of members around the world. Because of that their name is put so evidently in the materials of the 
campaign”. Interview, 2
nd July 2006 in New York. 
79 See A/CONF.192/2006/PC/CRP.17 
80 See United Nations General Assembly, Press release, “Preparatory Committee for Review Conference on 
Illicit Small Arms Trade Concludes without Agreement on Draft Final Document”, Department of Public 
Information, New York, 20/01/2006, DC/3011   21   
all its Aspects opened in New York on 26 June 2006. Spirits were high at the beginning of the 
Conference as many international actors believed that the adoption of a strong outcome document 
could be beneficial to the fight against the illicit trade of small arms. In his opening statement, the 
President of the Review Conference, Ambassador Kariyawasam, called upon the Member States 
to show “flexibility and political will to take this conference towards a successful conclusion”.
81 
However, even before the start of the Review Conference, there was some controversy. In the 
weeks  preceding  the  Review  Conference,  the  powerful  American  National  Rifle  Association 
(NRA) had launched a campaign of mass mailing to the UN to denounce the United Nations 
attempts  to  deny  the  rights  of  Americans  to  guns  ownership.
82  This  campaign  prompted  the 
Secretary-General to reaffirm in is speech that the Review Conference would not negotiate a 
“global gun ban” or try to “deny law-abiding citizens their right to bear arms in accordance with 
their national law”.
83 
 
At the Review Conference, the European Union reaffirmed that it was “convinced that the United 
Nations’ efforts to control SALW have to be intensified in particular in those crucial areas where 
significant obstacles to full implementation persist. The  EU believed that these  were transfer 
controls, marking and tracing, brokering regulations, ammunition and the integration of small 
arms  measures into development assistance”.
84 Several EU  member states, including the UK, 
Germany and the Netherlands also made statements supporting the EU’s priorities.  
 
IANSA and NGOs made it clear that they also intended to influence the negotiations. Through the 
international  campaign  Control  Arms,  more  than  a  million  pictures  of  faces  of  people  who 
supported the campaign were given to UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, on the first day the 
RevCon, a fact that had an important media repercussion.
85 On another front, up to 45 delegations 
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included representatives of civil society among their members.
86 This was crucial for IANSA as 
NGOs were excluded from full participation in the formal negotiations. 
 
In contrast to the position of the EU and IANSA, other states made it clear that they were not 
willing to negotiate on certain issues of PoA. The American position remained unchanged from 
the one held in previous meetings: the United States would not agree to negotiate any provisions 
restricting  civilian  possession  or  the  legal  trade  of  firearms  inconsistent  with  US  laws  and 
practices. The US position also remained unchanged on two other issues: ammunitions and the 
transfer to non-state actors.
87 A number of other states, including India and China, also expressed 
their reservations to negotiate on a number of issues. 
 
Formal negotiations on the draft final document were only initiated on the 5
th of July as the High-
level segment of the Conference overran the scheduled time.  However a number of informal 
meetings  were  held  between  the  30
th  June  and  7  July.  During  these  negotiations,  the  EU 
Presidency,  Austria  in  the  first  week  and  Finland  in  the  second  week,  held  a  number  of 
coordination meetings to achieve an EU common position on the key issues of the PoA. Two 
meeting with European NGOs were also organized.  
 
Despite the coordination efforts between the EU Member States and also with the NGOs, it soon 
became apparent that several EU member states were pushing for their own priorities. France and 
Germany wanted the document to include a reference to ammunitions and focused their efforts at 
the Review Conference on trying to reach a deal with the Americans on this specific issue. The 
UK was also an extremely active actor during the Review Conference. Being a strong supporter 
of the Arms Trade Treaty, the UK was perceived capable of leadership at the Review Conference. 
The UK made several proposals on transfer controls to the President of the Conference and also 
attempted to persuade the American delegation to support the inclusion of several issues in the 
final document.  With the Netherlands, the UK also advocated for the link between fight against 
the  spread  of  illicit  SALW  and  sustainable  development  to  be  recognized.  This  time,  the 
opposition came from a number of states from the Non-Aligned Movement including India and 
Indonesia and the Caribbean States, which raised concerns about the idea of conditionality on 
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development aid and about resources from the donor countries being diverted from development 
to small arms projects. 
   
The  Review  Conference  being  based  on  consensus  and  with  the  clock  ticking,  many  states 
realized that most of their efforts should be concentrated on convincing less enthusiastic states to 
support the final document. Negotiations were complicated by the fact that the US delegation had 
to send to Washington the various versions of the draft outcome document produced during the 
negotiations. This considerably slowed down the bargaining process. In the final hours of the 
Conference, some confusion also surrounded the negotiations. With the deadline of 6pm rapidly 
approaching, it became clear that no consensus could be reached on an outcome document. Some 
delegations hoped that the Review Conference would be extended for a few hours in order to find 
a similar agreement as the one reached at the first SALW Conference in 2001.  However, around 
5.30pm, Ambassador Kariyawasam began the procedures to close the conference and adopted a 
procedural document; the final outcome document stated that the Conference was not able to 
agree to conclude a final document.
88  
  
Many national delegations and NGOs representatives were extremely disappointed by the lack of 
result of the Conference; some states even described the Conference as a failure. Ambassador 
Kariyawasam in its closing remarks said that a consensus on the final document had been “within 
grasp”.  He  believed  that  despite  the  lack  of  consensus  on  a  final  document,  the  Review 
Conference had been successful in attracting the interest of the international community. In its 
final statement at the Conference, Finland on behalf of the EU, stated that the “conference has 
been a missed opportunity to make a real difference in our common fight against the scourge of 
illicit small arms and light weapons. The European Union regrets that some delegations have not 
been willing to make significant progress” and that it was “regrettable that the momentum created 
by the civil society was not matched by the flexibility by some states”.
89 
 
￿  Level II (EU) negotiations 
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Following the 2001 UN SALW Conference, the EU remained active on SALW. In July 2002, the 
EU adopted a new Joint Action
90, which replaced the 1998 Joint Action. The new version of the 
Joint Action reflected the German and French position on the role of ammunitions in conflicts 
affected by the negative consequences of SALW.  Almost a year later, in June 2003, under the 
Greek presidency, the EU adopted a Common Position on the controls of arms brokering. This 
Common Position established a clear legal framework and requested from the EU Member States 
to adopt the necessary national measures to control arms brokering activities on their territory
91. 
  
During its EU Presidency, the UK took several initiatives to address the SALW issue at the EU 
level. The General Affairs Council in October 2005 supported the idea put forward by the Control 
Arms campaign of an international treaty to establish common standards for the global trade in 
conventional arms.
92 A few months after the creation of the Control Arms campaign, the UK, the 
Control Arms campaign and the British NGO Saferworld organized a meeting in Brussels to 
discuss the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) with representatives from EU Member States, the European 
Commission and the European Parliament as well as various European NGOs.
93 The idea of the 
ATT rapidly gained support among the EU Member States as it would introduce international 
standards similar to the EU Code of Conduct, thus ensuring that EU arms manufacturers would 
not be disadvantaged in the global market.  
 
With the PrepCom approaching, the UK also realized the need for a clear and strong united EU 
position. The EU Strategy to combat the Illicit Accumulation and the Trafficking of SALW and 
their  Ammunitions  was  adopted  by  the  European  Council  on  15-16  December  2005.
94  The 
Strategy not only outlined measures to be taken at the international level but also within the EU.  
At the EU level, the Strategy’s Action Plan called for an effective response to the accumulation 
and the problems posed by the availability of existing stocks, but also for the establishment and 
development  of  the  necessary  structures  within  the  EU  to  deal  with  the  issue,  including  the 
strengthening of the Council Secretariat’s capabilities to ensure a coherent application of the 
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strategy ,The EU Strategy was adopted just a few weeks before the beginning of the PrepCom, 
with the expectation that the EU would play a crucial role at the Review Conference. 
 
 
￿  Level III (domestic) negotiations 
 
Following the 2001 UN Small Arms conference, the UK was one EU member states that most 
increased its involvement on the small arms issue. As early as July 2000, the British Government 
established the Global Conflict Prevention Pool, which included a strategy on small arms.  This 
pool  was  managed  jointly  by  the  Foreign  and  Commonwealth  Office,  the  Department  for 
International Development and the Ministry of Defence. The British small arms strategy aimed to 
coordinate  existing  programmes  managed  by  the  three  departments  under  a  single  set  of 
objectives and resources. It also included support for partnership with UN agencies and civil 
society. In addition to the small arms strategy, the British government adopted in 2002 the Export 
Control Act which introduced a strong revision of its export control legislation
95 and in July 2003, 
the UK with the support of France, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden, launched the Transfer 
Control Initiative (TCI),  which focused on assisting countries to strengthen controls over the 
export, import and transit of small arms.
96 
 
As mentioned before, the UK also became a vocal proponent for the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), 
partially due to the presence within the UK government of Jack Straw as Foreign Minister at the 
time. In March 2004, Straw announced that the UK supported the idea of an international treaty 
on the arms trade.
97  In all its initiatives regarding the ATT, the UK was supported by IANSA and 
the  Control  Arms  Campaign.  In  the  end,  the  UK  with  the  help  of  various  European  NGOs 
convinced its other EU partners of the need for the EU to support the ATT initiative; indeed the 
Control  Arms  campaign  gained  momentum  when  the  EU  member  states  supported  the  ATT 
during the European Council in October 2005. The Arms Trade Treaty was also supported by the 
British  Defence  Industry,  including  the  British  Defence  Manufacturers  Association  (DMA), 
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which regroups 550 defence companies, and key trade unions.
98   
 
National NGO campaigns in several EU Member States, particularly in the United Kingdom, 
Austria,  Germany and Belgium successfully pressed their government to address the issue of 
small arms and light weapons.  From its creation, IANSA developed  a close  connection  with 
several EU countries, but particularly with the UK. Indeed, it was partially the funding provided 
by  the  British  Department  for  International  Development  which  allowed  the  creation  and 
activities  of  the  first  years  of  the  Network.
99  This  obviously  provoked  critics  from  many 
organizations inside IANSA about being too Eurocentric and even too Britishcentric. In fact, the 
IANSA headquarters and most of its biggest and more influential members, including Amnesty 
International,  OXFAM  and  Saferworld,  are  based  in  London  (or  Oxford).  Even  if  this  fact 
facilitates  a  better  and  faster  coordination,  it  also  causes  difficulties  to  maintain  the  good 
relationships with the members of countries in other parts of the world, such as East-Asia or 
Western Africa.
100  
 
The  Austrian  NGOs  were  also  particularly  effective:  the  Austrian  government  in  May  2005 
adopted a new Foreign Trade Act dealing with transfer control.
101 Germany and Belgium were 
two other EU Member States that reiterated their commitment to curbing the negative effects of 
SALW following strong pressure from civil society. Both countries began to actively destroy 
their surplus and illicitly owned SALW. In 2002, Belgium was also the first EU countries to 
incorporate the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports into domestic law.
102 
 
 4- The 2006 Review Conference: A Missed Opportunity for the EU and NGOs?  
Negotiations at the 2006 Review Conference focused on multiple complex issues, including civil 
ownership, trade arms controls, transfers to non-state actors and development assistance. At the 
beginning of the Conference, the EU Member States showed a united front with the NGOs and 
campaigned for the adoption of strong international commitments on these issues. However, this 
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coalition failed to convince other states to support their position. Since the late 1990s, similar 
coalitions  composed  by  states  and  NGOs  have  been  successful  in  achieving  international 
agreements on issues such as the ban of landmines and the creation of an international criminal 
court.  Some  scholars  have  argued  that  in  these  two  cases,  successful  negotiations  on  human 
security have been typically the results of the combined efforts of great powers, middle powers, 
various elements of civil society and international organizations.
103 In this sense, the coalition 
formed  by  the  European  Union  and  IANSA  was  comprised  of  second-tiers  powers,  middle 
powers and many groups representing civil society. The coalition formed by the EU and NGOs 
could have been perceived as an “ideal” coalition, but it failed to convince other states to support 
the introduction of stricter  regulations to curtail the  spread of SALW.  Why  was this “ideal” 
coalition  unsuccessful  at  the  Review  Conference?  This  paper  suggests  that several  factors  at 
various levels of negotiations may have affected the relationship between the EU and NGOs and 
their mutual success in these negotiations. 
 
 
First, the interactions between the EU and NGOs prior to the Review Conference suggested that 
these two players could potentially be effective partners in international negotiations on SALW. 
From the end of the 1990s, European NGOs intensely and successfully lobbied several key EU 
member states to adopt stricter regulations regarding small arms not only at the domestic level, 
but also at EU level. These efforts seem to have been fruitful as, between 2001 and 2006, the EU 
adopted more than a dozen agreements addressing the issue of small arms, including a series of 
Joint Actions, an EU Code of Conduct, an EU Plan of Action and the EU Strategy on small arms. 
The EU Member States also used European NGOs to raise awareness on the SALW issue and 
gained public support for their embrace of “humanitarian values”.  
 
However, during the negotiations at the Preparatory Committee and the Review Conference, it 
became clear that these interactions had not yet formalized  an effective relationship between 
these two groups of actors. The EU’s apparent willingness to listen to NGOs did not transform 
itself into formal cooperation:  no plan of action was agreed between the EU and IANSA. The 
two coordination meetings organized between  EU government representatives and  EU  NGOs 
during the Review Conference failed to produce a common strategy and therefore effectively 
influence the negotiations. Furthermore, as NGOs were not allowed to be full participants in the 
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negotiations, their representation in national delegations was seen as quite crucial at the Review 
Conference. Even though 45 delegations at the Review Conference included members of civil 
society, the representation of NGOs within the delegations of EU Member States was overall 
quite weak. With the notable exception of Germany which had five NGOs representatives and 
Finland  and  Sweden  which  both  had  three,  most  EU  Member  States  delegations,  including 
France, did not include a representative from civil society.
104 It is also interesting to note that the 
UK,  which  had  developed  strong  relationship  with  IANSA  had  only  one  civil  society 
representative.  
 
The lack of strong of leadership both within the EU camp and the IANSA network may have also 
affected the success of the EU-NGOs coalition at the Review Conference. Austria and Finland, 
which held the EU Presidency during the negotiations, seemed to display a formal leadership. 
However, the effective leadership was mostly exerted by the United Kingdom, arguably the most 
active  state  during  the  Review  Conference.  During  the  negotiations,  the  UK  made  several 
proposals on transfer controls and also attempted to persuade the American delegation to support 
the outcome document. However, these British initiatives were criticized by other EU member 
states as some of these states felt that the UK was too close to the United States to advocate strict 
positions  on  some  of  the  controversial  issues.  The  UK  also  made  several  proposals  and 
suggestions to the President of the Conference, especially on transfer controls, without consulting 
its EU partners.  The  EU’s lack of leadership might also stem from other EU member states, 
including  France  and  Germany,  pursuing  their  own  priorities  rather  than  EU  position.  This 
resulted in a situation where  “in attempts to take stronger positions on a number of themes, 
several EU member states spoke on behalf of their individual governments, rather than allowing 
the moderate joint EU statements to represent them”
105 and influenced the EU’s capacity to exert 
clear leadership in the negotiations.  
 
On the NGOs side, it was unclear who held the real leadership. This is a factor frequently cited by 
participants in the RevCon as something that needed to be improved in the future.
106 For example, 
most of IANSA daily meetings were headed by senior activists, who were neither part of the 
IANSA secretariat nor of the  IANSA Steering  Committee.  Furthermore,  IANSA had  a  weak 
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approach towards the EU as a collective actor. Throughout the Review Conference, several EU 
Member States, including the UK and the two states holding the EU Presidency, Austria and 
Finland, were perceived as the natural allies by most of the NGO Community. Partially due to the 
fact that the majority of NGOs that created IANSA are UK-based and have already established 
relationship with certain EU Member States, activists tended to overly rely on a small number of 
EU member states to defend their position at the Review Conference. In this process IANSA not 
only neglected to support the EU as a collective actor, but also overlooked other potential allies, 
who could have helped to develop a broader approach towards all the states that participated in 
the Conference. 
 
The fact that the consensus rule was applied during the Review Conference is another factor that 
influenced  the  success  of  the  EU-IANSA  partnership.  In  this  sense,  several  authors  have 
emphasized that institutional decision-making rules can shape negotiations at the international 
level.
107  Consensus  does  not  require  unanimity  on  all  points  from  all  the  member  states 
participating  in  negotiations:  it  is  generally  an  agreement  on  general  objectives.  Yet,  it  is 
interesting to note that negotiations in UN-sponsored conferences only resume when there is a 
consensus that will not be challenged.
108 Hence, most often in UN negotiations, consensus is 
viewed as a type of informal unanimity. Consensus not only constitutes a very high threshold in 
decision-making,  but  often  becomes  an  extremely  slow  process.
109  With  the  clock  ticking  at 
Review Conference, the EU Member States as well as IANSA realize that most of their efforts 
should be concentrated on convincing other states to support the final (weak) document rather 
than pushing for more stringent commitments. But not even that could be achieved. 
In the context of a consensus-based conference, the reluctance of several states to negotiate on 
certain specific issues clearly had an effect on the EU-NGOs coalition. The inflexibility of the 
Americans regarding their “red lines” constituted a colossal obstacle for the coalition formed by 
the EU and IANSA. In addition, constant communications between Washington and New York 
considerably slowed down the negotiations. However the United States did support some of the 
EU  and IANSA priorities, such as the possible codification of global guidelines for a future 
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agreement  in  arms  trade  (as  long  as  they  were  not  legally  binding)  and  initiatives  regarding 
transfers control. Conversely, Cuba, India and other countries, such as Iran and Pakistan refused 
to  negotiate  on  these  issues.  Furthermore,  two  of  the  main  producers  of  SALW,  China  and 
Russia, appear to have used the consensus rule (where a sole negative voice is enough to block 
negotiations) to maintain their hard positions on certain issues without making much noise. 
At the Review Conference, the EU was also criticized by other states for spending too much time 
on trying to coordinate the EU position and not enough talking to other potential allies, including 
several African and Asian states. This was seen as particularly problematic as these are the most 
affected regions by the scourge of SALW. In fact, most African and Asian countries supported 
proposals  for  stronger  regulations.  However,  these  states,  lacking  the  necessary  strength  and 
resources, were not in a position to impose their preferences and crucially needed the EU to 
support their initiatives. Furthermore, the EU was not able to clearly convey their priorities to 
these potential allies. For example, the EU failed to convince key partners to recognize the link 
between development assistance and the adoption of international measures on SALW. Indeed, 
several developing countries, particularly the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), vetoed any 
mention in the final document of the link between fight against the spread of illicit SALW and 
sustainable  development.  These  states  raised  concerns  about  the  idea  of  conditionality  on 
development  aid  and  about  resources  diverted  from  development  programmes  to  small  arms 
projects. The EU’s initiatives to create new funds to specifically deal with the proliferation of 
small arms  were thus unnoticed or  misinterpreted by the developing countries. In both these 
cases, the EU might have used IANSA support to lobby other states to support their positions, but 
it failed to do so and therefore did not recognize some of the benefits of being in a coalition with 
NGOs. 
 
Lastly, it should be noted that the management of the negotiations at the Review Conference also 
created obstacles for the EU-IANSA coalition. First, the negotiation phase was extremely short: 
formal negotiations on the draft final document were only initiated during the second week of the 
Conference as the High-level segment of the Conference overran the scheduled time. This fact 
was aggravated by a weak position of the president of the RevCon, Ambassador Kariyawasam 
from Sri Lanka. On the one hand, the Ambassador had to deal with the strong demands of the EU 
and  IANSA.  On  the  other  hand,  he  also  had  to  manage  the  reluctance  of  powerful  states  to   31   
negotiate on several issues on the table.
110 Finally, it should be noted that informal negotiations 
during the last days of the Review Conference mainly took place in English and in the absence of 
translators. Many developing countries, including several African francophone states, therefore 
felt marginalized during the last phase of the negotiations. 
Conclusion 
 
This paper aimed to explore the conditions that might have influenced the relationship between 
the EU and NGOs and their mutual success at the 2006 UN Small Arms Review Conference. The 
European Union has been one of the most committed actors in the fight against the proliferation 
of small arms and light weapons. The EU has also appeared to have found a strong partner in the 
International  Action  Network  on  Small  Arms  (IANSA).  Indeed,  NGOs  under  the  umbrella 
organization IANSA undoubtedly pressed UN member states to include some of their (and the 
EU) proposals in the final document of the RevCon and their contribution was acknowledged by 
several governments.
111 However, this paper has shown that this partnership was not successful 
during the Review Conference: the European Union and IANSA both failed to convince several 
reluctant states to support the reinforcement of the UN Programme of Action on small arms and 
light weapons.  
 
In the case of the Review Conference, the leadership showed by “middle powers” seemed to have 
been less evident than other negotiations on human security issues, such as the landmines case. In 
contrast to the landmines case, the “middle powers” could not unite behind one specific goal 
during the Review Conference. The challenges posed by SALW are multifaceted and involve 
various  issues.  This  reality  visibly  complicated  negotiations  and  might  have  led  the  middle 
powers to perceive that the costs of forming a coalition and leading negotiations would be higher 
than the benefits.  
 
The literature on coalition suggested that as NGO advocacy grows and stimulates more national 
support for their cause, the risks of middle powers of assuming leadership and forming coalitions 
                                                 
110 In this sense, some observers interviewed by the authors during the Review Conference suggested that 
Ambassador  Kariyawasam's  delicate  position  came  from  the  fact  that  he  did  not  want  to  affect  the 
possibilities of former UN under-secretary general for disarmament affairs, Jayantha Dhanapala, also from 
Sri Lanka, to replace Kofi Annan as UN Secretary General. 
111 A number of countries mentioned specifically the role of NGOs (or in a more general way 'civil society') 
in their final speeches of the meeting, including Canada, Pakistan and the final statement by the president 
of the RevCon, Prasad Kariyawasam.    32   
should be lowered. However, in the case of Review Conference, these risks seemed not have been 
lowered  enough  to  convince  the  EU  member  states  to  effectively  lead  the  dynamics  of  the 
Conference towards achieving a meaningful outcome document. 
 
Finally, the failure of the negotiations during the Review Conference, but also in other cases of 
UN negotiations, has lead to a strong criticism of the rule of consensus as the way of decision-
making at the UN. The consensus rule visibly affected the mutual success of both the EU and the 
NGOs in small arms negotiations. In their closing speeches at the Review Conference, several 
states while criticizing the use of consensus also acknowledged the importance to deal with this 
issue multilaterally. In short, several states seemed to reaffirm their commitment to negotiate in 
the  UN,  but  in  a  different  negotiating  environment.    This  “new”  environment,  or  “new 
diplomacy”, might emerge in the next few years and give a chance to the EU and NGOs to renew 
and redesign their relationship. In the end, only an effective EU-NGOs partnership will produce 
successful initiatives to curtail the spread of small arms and light weapons.  
. 